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“Maladaptive” Federalism:
THE STRUCTURAL BARRIERS
TO COORDINATION OF STATE
SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVES
Jim Rossi†
Abstract
The federal government has been slow to confront problems such
as climate change, but many states have adopted innovative
approaches to addressing the impacts of using natural resources to
produce energy, including aggressive regulation of carbon emissions
and renewable energy standards. This Article questions whether
celebration of these types of state initiatives as a form of “adaptive”
federalism is premature. The Article identifies an emerging challenge
that subnational regulation faces in the energy and environmental
context—what I will call “maladaptive” federalism—and argues that
federalism discussions need to account for its possibility.
Part I highlights adaptive regulation as a form of federalism,
echoing a vision for subnational regulation that many federalism
scholars and policymakers have endorsed over the past two decades.
Part II argues that policy choices by subnational units of
government that fail to account for or consider these coordination
benefits should not be celebrated as a form of adaptive federalism
merely because they are state policy choices. I identify subnational
recalcitrance (on inaction by states) and backlash (or reversing
course) as two potential types of maladaptation, provide examples of
each, and use these to illustrate the structural features of subnational
governments that make maladaptation most likely.
Part III evaluates the pro-adaptation tools that federal agencies
can use to address the enactment costs of states taking maladaptive
approaches. In certain contexts, such as in clean energy initiatives,
focusing on enactment costs associated with the structure of state
governments will be superior to federal policies that preempt
subnational units of government altogether by making the policy
choice for them. Such tools not only make maladaptation less likely;
they also help to ensure that when a state does opt for a maladaptive
policy path that it does so because it is making explicit tradeoffs in
†

Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. Versions of this Article
were presented at workshops at Boston College Law School, Tulane
University Law School, and Case Western Reserve University School of
Law. I am grateful to participants there and especially to Jonathan
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ways that are more likely to be welfare-enhancing and politically
accountable.
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Introduction
This Article identifies an emerging challenge that subnational
regulation faces in the energy and environmental context—what I will
call “maladaptive” federalism—and argues that federalism discussions
need to account for its possibility. What is known as “adaptive”
federalism sees subnational units of government as effective
institutions for promoting regulatory experimentation and solving
regulatory problems, especially in the energy and environmental law
arena.1 While the federal government has been slow to adopt climate
change initiatives, many state governments have enacted innovative
approaches to addressing the impacts of using natural resources to
produce energy, including aggressive approaches to regulating carbon
emissions and renewable energy standards.2 To name a few examples:
more than 30 states have adopted Renewable Portfolio Standards
1.

See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism:
The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92
Minn. L. Rev. 1796 (2008) (arguing that an adaptive model should be
utilized in the framework for environmental federalism). From what I
can tell, this view was first advanced as an intergovernmental theory in
Australia, by Bhajan Gewal at the James Cook University of North
Queensland. Bhajan S. Grewal, Economic criteria for the assignment of
functions in a federal system, in Towards Adaptive Federalism: A
Search for Criteria for Responsibility Sharing in a Federal
System 5 (Australian Advisory Council for Intergovernmental Relations
ed., 1981).

2.

See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1846–49, for examples of states
leading climate change policy initiatives.
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(RPSs), requiring a certain percentage of electric power sold to come
from renewable sources;3 California has adopted comprehensive
climate change legislation;4 and several states have been leaders in
promoting renewable energy and clean energy initiatives, including
smart grids.5
Many environmental law policymakers and scholars celebrate
adaptive federalism because subnational institutions can better adapt
to unique geographic conditions and promote policy experimentation
and its diffusion.6 Seeing environmental law advocates look to
subnational governments seems surprising, given environmental law’s
insistence on the superiority of national regulation in addressing
jurisdictional spillover problems associated with pollution. Perhaps it
is even odder to see environmental law scholars embrace subnational
units of government in addressing a problem like climate change,
where the harms are widely recognized to be global rather than local.7
There is a simple pragmatism to this turn towards subnational
3.

See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National
RPS, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 1339, 1375–79 (2010). See also Brannon P.
Denning, Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio
Standards, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1519 (2014) (providing a survey
of a range of RPS programs and some of the constitutional challenges
that they may present).

4.

See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 10 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1097, 1099–1100 (2009) (asserting the significant climate
change initiatives to come from California as examples of iterative
federalism schemes).

5.

Texas, for example, has been a leader in promoting wind power and
building infrastructure to encourage its development. See David A.
King, Interregional Coordination of Electric Transmission and Its
Impact on Texas Wind, 8 Tex. J. Oil, Gas & Energy L. 309, 310
(2013). Joel Eisen has discussed the role of states in implementing smart
grid initiatives. See Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for
the Smart Grid, 37 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2013). There are many
other environmental/energy contexts where states have been leaders,
such as building codes, appliance standards, and auto emissions
standards. See Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards for Nationwide
Products Revisited: Federalism, Green Building Codes, and Appliance
Efficiency Standards, 34 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 335 (2010); Carlson,
supra note 4, at 1115.

6.

See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1801 (asserting that an adaptive
model of federalism is an important advance). Adaptive federalism is
also called “iterative” federalism. See Carlson, supra note 4, at 1099.
Others refer to this as “dynamic” or “collaborative” federalism. See infra
notes 15, 17, and accompanying text.

7.

See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action
Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental
Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev.
579, 610 (2008) (asserting climate change is a global problem in
analyzing federal regulation of it).
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governments in environmental law: At the subnational level it is
easier to pass new initiatives, making adaptive federalism a
particularly attractive approach for policy innovation.
Against the backdrop of federal legislative inaction—no doubt in
part rooted in federal institutions that have held up legislation, such
as the Senate—climate change policy initiatives have had more
traction at the subnational level.8 State governments are closer and
more reactive to their constituent stakeholders than the U.S.
Congress, do not suffer from mass geographic diversity that plagues
U.S. lawmaking, and may face fewer veto points than Congress.
According to some, subnational regulatory initiatives may even be
superior to federal legislation, which could potentially limit the space
for state initiatives or hamper innovation and experimentation.9
Beyond these benefits to adaptive federalism, environmental
scholars have paid less attention to how subnational policies can
produce coordination benefits beyond any individual state’s borders
and what impact this has on federalism discussions. To take an
example related to renewable energy, harmonized RPS standards
across individual states produce spillover benefits for renewable
project developers and others in the financing and contracting
process.10 Planning for and allocating the costs of multistate project
infrastructure such as transmission and power grid reliability also
produces important benefits for renewable power projects, regardless
of any particular jurisdiction.11 Of course, there are always positive
externalities to the policy diffusion related to subnational innovation,
but the coordination benefits I describe transcend the diffusion
of ideas.
This Article argues that, in many public goods contexts, that
there are externalities that go beyond experimentation itself—benefits
(and sometimes even costs) that receive almost no attention in the
federalism literature. In contexts where adaptation produces positive
policy externalities, federalism is challenged to account for the
8.

See Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is
Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem
and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?,
38 Urb. Law. 1015, 1023–26 (2006) (asserting that economic and
political factors provide an explanation for the success of local and state
efforts in addressing climate change).

9.

See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1801 (stating that adaptive
federalism would combat federal regulations that hamper state’s efforts);
Jonathan H. Adler, When is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal
Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
67, 70 (2007) (arguing that federal action can directly limit the
effectiveness of state action).

10.

See infra notes 34, 36 and accompanying text.

11.

See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.

1762

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·2014
“Maladaptive” Federalism

possibility that individual states can just as readily take positions
that hobble or thwart the production of public goods as they can
promote them. Specifically, the analysis of this Article explores
whether there should be limits on a state or other subnational unit of
government acting independently when this stands in the way of
other states creating coordination benefits from an adaptive
federalism program such as climate change or sustainable energy
initiatives.
Part I highlights adaptive regulation as a form of federalism,
echoing a vision for subnational regulation that many federalism
scholars and policymakers have endorsed over the past two decades.
As Part I suggests, adaptive federalism does not embrace subnational
regulation per se, but because it advances other values, such as
promoting policy experimentation and its diffusion—the core value of
adaptive federalism. Diffusion itself is a spillover benefit from
adaptation, albeit a benefit that is indifferent to any particular
institution’s policy choice. Beyond diffusion, I argue that in many
contexts adaptation also produces other benefits related to the
substance of policy—which can take the form of coordination benefits
(positive externalities) of adaptation that spillover to the regional or
national level.
Part II argues that policy choices by subnational units of
government that fail to account for or consider these coordination
benefits should not be celebrated as a form of adaptive federalism
merely because they are state policy choices. Structural features of
state governments can contribute to the possibility of subnational
governments failing to recognize these coordination benefits—what I
characterize as “maladaptation.” I identify subnational recalcitrance
(inaction by states) and backlash (reversing course) as two potential
types of maladaptation, provide examples of each, and use these to
illustrate the structural features of subnational governments that
make maladaptation most likely.
Preserving a role for states to dissent from trends and from
inchoate national or regional policies is important, even essential, to
federalism. However, that does not mean that federalism must be
indifferent to every substantive state policy choice. Part III maintains
that to the extent the potential for maladaptation subverts welfareenhancing coordination, it is an appropriate concern for regulators. I
identify a variety of legal tools that regulators and courts can look to
in order to address the decision costs of maladaptation and make it
less likely, especially in contexts where national regulators have
endorsed subnational trends or policy choices. These include
substantive preemption by statute or regulation, explicit interstate
entrenchment tools designed to promote adaptive regulatory
commitments, and process preemption. Adaptive federalism may be
mostly likely to flourish in situations where Congress has established
direct enforcement “sticks” (such as in the context of the Clean Air
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Act), but it is also an important regulatory approach even where a
federal agency has no direct enforcement authority.
Part III argues in favor of pro-adaptation tools that federal
agencies can use to address the enactment costs of states taking
maladaptive approaches. In certain contexts, focusing on enactment
costs associated with the structure of state governments will be
superior to federal policies that preempt subnational units of
government altogether by making the policy choice for them. Such
tools not only make maladaptation less likely; they also help to ensure
that when a state does opt for a maladaptive policy path that it does
so because it is making explicit tradeoffs in ways that are more likely
to be welfare-enhancing and politically accountable. I identify the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC’s) Order 1000,
which addresses transmission and cost allocation for renewable energy
projects, as a lead example of how a federal agency can discourage
maladaptation without preempting state policy choices.12
The potential for maladaptation in state policy choices is a
legitimate area of concern for regulatory federalism. Understanding
the potential maladaptation in state lawmaking is important to
identifying when subnational decisions will promote coordination and
positive externalities, or conflicts between different policies can
potentially get in the way. I conclude that paying attention to the
decision costs of maladaptive subnational decisions provides an
important alternative to the conventional options of leaving policy
choices entirely to the whims of state politics or to Congress or federal
regulators making the choices for states.

I.

Adaptive Federalism

Adaptive federalism is the view that state and local governments
can better experiment and conform their policies to the particular
conditions that they face and the preferences of their citizenry. David
Edelman and Kirsten Engel perceptively advocate for a version of
adaptive federalism in solving problems associated with climate
change and energy sustainability—an approach that would allow
multiple jurisdictions to independently address the problem without
ceding authority or limiting strategies.13 Environmental law is an
especially likely candidate for such an approach, notwithstanding the
existence of significant federal statutes and regulations regarding
pollution. As William Buzbee has highlighted, major federal
environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water
Act envision state governments playing a major implementation and

12.

See infra Part III.C.

13.

See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1801.
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enforcement role that exceed a federal floor, or minimum regulatory
standard.14
Apart from the legal structure allowing for states to set stricter
standards than the federal government, it is perhaps not surprising
that adaptive federalism has many converts in the environmental law
community—where some also refer to this approach as “dynamic,”15
“iterative,”16 or “collaborative” federalism.17 The federal government,
Congress in particular, has been steadfast in its inaction related to
climate change. States, most notoriously California, have been far
more aggressive innovators on this front. If one prefers more
aggressive environmental approaches to solving problems related to
climate change, state and local governments are a more fertile level of
government for policy adoption.
But adaptive federalism is not merely a convenient political
strategy for pursuing a certain policy vision to address climate
change. There are legitimate benefits to adaptive federalism that
transcend any particular policy agenda on substantive issues such as
the environment. Adaptive federalism is a serious theory of
federalism, not just a political strategy. Although many different
accounts of adaptive federalism have been advanced, these share
emphasis on promoting policy experimentation and learning and the
values of interjurisdictional competition and the advantages of
subnational regulation. Less recognized is how adaptive federalism
policies can mediate interstate coordination problems and create
spillover benefits. In other words, where coordinated, adaptive
federalism programs can produce some of the benefits of national
regulation (by addressing interstate spillovers), without embracing a
one-size-fits-all solution to problems such as climate change.

14.

See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption
and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1576 (2007)
(asserting that states can choose their own strategies using the federal
law as a starting point). See Adler, supra note 9, at 70, for the argument
that federal floors can adversely impact or effect the level of state
regulation.

15.

See Hari Osofsky & Hannah Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72
Md. L. Rev. 773, 774 (2013) (advocating for a multidimensional
federalism approach); see also Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits
of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 Emory L.J. 159,
162–63 (2006) (arguing for states to have the freedom to develop policy
situations).

16.

Carlson, supra note 4, at 1099 (highlighting iterative features of
environmental federalism).

17.

Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation,
54 Duke L.J. 795, 801, 843 (2005) (presenting a detailed case study of a
collaborative federal-state approach to watershed regulation in
California).
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A.

Policy Experimentation in Addressing Climate Change

Justice Louis Brandeis famously praised state and local
governments as “laboratories of democracy.”18 Climate change is
widely recognized to be a global problem.19 Yet in the context of
addressing the problems associated with climate change, the policy
benefits of experimentation and subnational innovation related to
climate change solutions can be significant. More than 30 states have
established RPS standards to encourage the development of renewable
energy.20 Many states have also regulated carbon emissions, most
notably California, and nearly 20 states have established energy
efficiency standards.21
This kind of subnational innovation produces positive goods in
the form of knowledge benefits and innovation in sustainable and
renewable energy. The U.S. encompasses a vast body of land with
varying environmental conditions, along with significant variations in
the tastes and preference of citizens and economic conditions. Local
decision makers will be better equipped with the knowledge and
expertise to solve problems in ways that adapt to local circumstances.
Climate change is widely recognized to be a global problem,22 but the
most effective and cost-effective mechanisms for addressing its effects
will vary significantly from place to place. That leaves state and local
governments a significant role to play in formulating and
implementing policy solutions to climate change or other
environmental law problems.
A good illustration of how adaptation can produce these benefits
is the variations in geology and resources that produce opportunities
for energy production, and understanding how that production will
impact ecology and the environment. David Adelman and Kirsten
Engel provide a range of examples of innovation that are dependent
18.

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (stating, “a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).

19.

See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 1962 (2007) (asserting
that subnational solutions are not the best way to combat global climate
change).

20.

See Davies, supra note 3, at 1375–77 (providing data on the 36 states
that have adopted Renewable Portfolio Standards); see also DSIRE:
Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, RPS Data,
http://www.dsireusa.org/rpsdata/index.cfm (follow “DSIRE RPS Data
Spreadsheet” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (containing the most
recent state RPS data from March 2013).

21.

See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 167–76
(2011), for one snapshot of these various innovations.

22.

See Wiener, supra note 19, at 1962.

1766

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·2014
“Maladaptive” Federalism

on resource allocation and also responsive to environmental concerns,
including state adoption of standards and goals for renewable
energy.23 David Spence has also recently made a compelling case for
why states should retain significant authority related to the regulation
of natural gas fracking activities and their effects.24
Such experimentation can also produce the benefit of innovation.
Ann Carlson asserts that state experimentation not only better
matches the problems to the local knowledge needed to solve them,
but that it also can produce better innovation.25 This kind of
technological innovation may occur if state regulatory measures
induce private investment in the development of technologies to meet
local emissions controls26 or other requirements such as smart grid27 or
energy efficiency standards.28 There are also positive externalities
created by state innovation due to policy diffusion in the
policymaking sphere. Both federal and state regulators can learn from
each other where state and local governments have the flexibility to
adapt in adopting and enforcing environment and energy standards.
This learning can improve the overall quality regulation—a theory of
federalism that others outside of environmental and energy law circles
have referred to as “democratic experimentalism.”29
B.

Interjurisdictional Competition for Sustainable Energy

But the benefits of adaptation go beyond facilitating diversity in
matching problems to local knowledge and circumstances and
promoting policy diffusion. The idea that states are better suited than
the federal government to “adapt” to social problems such as climate
23.

See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1848 (arguing that state action
can feed back into encouraging federal action).

24.

See David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political
Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431, 432 (2013)
(asserting there is no overriding national interest to regulating fracking
activities because of the controversy surrounding fracking).

25.

See Carlson, supra note 4, at 1135–36 (using California as an example of
a state utilizing private investment to encourage innovation and reduce
emissions).

26.

Id.

27.

See Eisen, supra note 5, at 21 (asserting that private investment in
innovating with the smart grid can be utilized in a dynamic federalism
model).

28.

See Klass, supra note 5.

29.

See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998) (“We call the
overall system of public problem solving that combines federal learning
with the protection of the interests of the federated jurisdictions and the
rights of the individuals democratic experimentalism.”) (emphasis in
original).
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change is consistent with the idea of federalism as promoting a kind of
interjurisdictional competition. As Ilya Somin writes:
Whereas the theory of interstate diversity assumes merely that
states are responsive to the preferences of citizen-voters already
residing within their boundaries, the theory of interstate
competition asserts that states actively compete with each other
to attract new citizens, who can improve their lot through the
power of “exit” rights. Conversely, states also strive to ensure
that current residents will not depart for greener pastures
offered by competitors. Citizens dissatisfied with state policy
have the option not only of lobbying for changes but also of
moving to another state that deliberately seeks to attract them
with more favorable policies. To the benefits of political voice
provided by interstate diversity, the possibility of interstate
competition adds those of exit.30

An adaptive approach to federalism in the context of energy and
climate change policy nicely illustrates how interjurisdictional
competition could work. From the perspective of citizens, living in
states that use lower carbon sources of energy might have an impact
on the health and well-being of citizens and their offspring. Relying on
a diversity of sources to generate electricity, as RPS standards
promote, might soften the impact of volatilities in energy prices
introduced through world political and economic events. Moreover,
living in a state that is better prepared to address the effects of
climate change might reduce the costs of property or health insurance
and better insulate citizens from the extreme effects of weather
patterns, coastal sea rise and the like.
Whether this kind of competition actually occurs in citizen
decisions is the subject of much disagreement in the federalism
literature.31 In contrast, there is considerable evidence that
competition in state policy approaches has an effect on business
decisions of firms in deciding where to locate plants and their
operations.32 In the context of state sustainability initiatives, RPS
standards are frequently touted as driving investments in energy
development. There appears to be some anecdotal correlation between
states with RPS standards and sustainable or green investment

30.

Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for
Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 Geo.
L.J. 461, 468 (2001).

31.

See generally, Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental Federalism: A Survey
of the Empirical Literature, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1669 (2014).

32.

Id. at 1683–84 (summarizing second-generation studies that show a
meaningful effect of environmental regulation on the location of
economic activity).
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activities.33 Yet this correlation does not appear to be conclusive of
causation, since many of the states with RPS standards also appear to
be states that are already rich in the natural resources needed to
produce renewable energy.34
C.

Mediating Interstate Coordination Problems

Less appreciated is how adaptive federalism solutions can produce
policy benefits beyond diffusion, innovation, and competition. Where
states converge on similar policy approaches, they may be able to
solve spillover problems on their own by coordinating regulatory
approaches. Environmental and energy regulation provides an
example of these kinds of coordination benefits. In environmental law,
it is well-recognized that state emissions standards can lead to the
reduction of cross-border air and water emissions. The sharing of
enforcement resources and information can also assist states, and
sometimes even federal regulators, in implementing and enforcing
standards.
In the energy context, the spillover benefits of coordination that
flow from adaptive federalism are also significant. The benefits of a
critical number of states coordinating their policy initiatives related to
sustainable energy seem obvious where what is at issue are technical
standards related to the interconnection of renewable sources with the
grid or technologies such as smart meters. States are already working
in this direction as they coordinate with private standard-setting
organizations in the electric power industry.35 Standards such as RPS
have also facilitated coordination in utilities offering standard offer
contracts for renewable power projects; these kinds of contracts have
been essential to providing the credible commitments for projects
necessary to attract long-term financing.36 As state RPS standards
33.

See, e.g., Mindy Lubber, Protecting Renewable Portfolio Standards from
Cynical Attacks, FORBES (March 19, 2013, 1:02 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/mindylubber/2013/03/19/protecting-renewableportfolio-standards-from-cynical-attacks/.

34.

Magali A. Delmas & Maria J. Montes-Sancho, U.S. State Policies for
Renewable Energy: Context and Effectiveness, 39 Energy Pol’y 2273,
2282 (2011) (“While higher natural resources endowment can facilitate
the adoption of policies that are not effective, some effective policies
might be adopted in states with low resource potential . . . . [F]actors
other than natural resources can predict successful renewable policies.”).

35.

See Eisen, supra note 5 (describing state-led process, but ultimately
arguing in favor of a national-led initiative to set standards for
interconnection and smart grids).

36.

Like TVA, many utilities subject to RPS standards operate in many
states and, as RPS standards in the state in which they operate have
proliferated, this has facilitated their offering standard offer contracts
that provide power producers and consumers similar terms, reducing the
costs of financing projects. TVA Generation Partners Program / Mid-
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have proliferated, one problem that has arisen is that state renewable
energy credits differ across state regarding what counts as a renewable
resource and how these are credited towards RPS goals; the
availability of tradable renewable energy credits present a monitoring
problem, presenting the opportunity for double counting or even
fraud.37 Even absent any federal initiative or leadership relating to the
issue, adaptive federalism approaches have facilitated the
harmonization of renewable energy credits—coordination that ensures
that the goals of RPS standards are not undermined.38
Perhaps no issue in the energy industry illustrates the
coordination benefits of adaptive federalism as vividly as does electric
power transmission. The siting of electric power transmission lines is
largely controlled by state regulators, who also bear direct
responsibility for deciding who pays for the costs of new lines in retail
rates. Adaptive federalism approaches to encouraging the
development of new sources of electric power create shared
opportunities and incentives for investment in new infrastructure. As
multiple states in a particular region of the U.S. have developed a
shared vision for the growth of renewable sources of electric power,
there arises a need for new infrastructure to bring power supply to
customers. For example, in the Midwest, multiple states have invested
in promoting the development of wind energy, and share interests in
seeing transmission expanded to accommodate transmitting wind
energy to a larger customer base.39 This kind of coordination can
diffuse and minimize many of the barriers that might otherwise exist
in state siting of transmission lines, including holdout problems.
These spillover benefits open up the door for better coordination
of sustainability policies across states and improve the chances that
any individual state’s climate change initiatives will be successful. In
Sized Standard Offer, United States Environmental Protection
Agency (Sept. 26, 2012), http://epa.gov/agstar/tools/funding/
incentive/Regional%20%28AL,%20GA,%20KY,%20MS,%20NC,%20TN,
%20VA%29tvagenerationpartnersprogrammidsized.html (TVA’s standard offer contract).
37.

See Davies, supra note 3, at 1376–78, for a discussion about differences
across states in accounting approaches for RECs.

38.

See Center for Energy Economics, Bureau of Economic Geology,
University of Texas at Austin, Harmonization of Renewable Energy
Credit (REC) Markets Across the U.S., Center for Energy
Economics (Nov. 2009), http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/
transmission_forum/CEE_National_RECs_study.pdf.

39.

See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate
Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism
Mismatch, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1801 (2012) (describing the need for
coordination in state transmission siting decisions, especially to address
the development of wind energy in the Midwest and Western United
States).
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this sense, coordination among state policies can help to solve regional
(and even national) problems—even in instances where the federal
government has not imposed a floor or any incentive for states to take
initiative. For sustainable energy, the spillover coordination benefits
of adaptive federalism may be just as significant as the more
conventionally recognized benefits, such as experimentation and
interjurisdictional competition.

II. Federalism’s Potential for Maladaptation
The adaptive federalism account above tells a very optimistic
story about state regulation. But there is another side to the coin. A
state acting independently can serve as a form of adaptation,
especially when it produces some of the benefits described above.
However, some of the same features of state and local governments
that make adaptation attractive—such as the low costs of enacting
laws—can also threaten or undermine it. Structural features of state
governments may impede the ability of a state to recognize and weigh
the interstate coordination benefits of its policy choice, producing the
possibility of what I call “maladaptation.” For example, state limits
on executive authority can limit the ability of governors or state
agencies to take the lead in adopting adaptive policies in the first
place. Even where a state has adopted an adaptive policy, such as an
RPS standard, the ease of overcoming veto points in the state
lawmaking process can just as easily lead a state to endorse parochial
policies that fail to recognize the coordination benefits associated
with adaptation.
The potential for adaptation at the state and local government
level is no doubt present. But so is a potential for maladaptation—
states acting in ways that thwart interstate coordination or other
spillover associated with adaptive federalism. Conflating maladaptive
forms of state regulation with adaptive federalism—as does the
conventional account, which assumes states will always promote the
goals of adaptive federalism merely by experimenting—is a conceptual
and practical mistake. It masks important problems that policymakers
must take into account for adaptive regulatory programs to succeed
where there is a possibility of coordination benefits. I identify two
types of maladaptation: recalcitrance, a type of state holdout
problem, and backlash, or states reversing course to subvert
sustainability initiatives of surrounding states.
A.

Maladaptive Recalcitrance

Recalcitrance represents a classic form of government inaction. It
occurs when a state or local unit of government makes no decision at
all regarding a crucial issue of regional or national importance.
California may have been a leader in adopting climate change policies,
but other states such as West Virginia have not been quick out of the
gate in addressing the impacts of carbon emissions. Failure to address
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social problems in the first place is commonplace and occurs for a
variety of reasons, including a deliberate judgment by policymakers
that the benefits of acting do not justify the costs.
Recalcitrance can be quite consistent with the features of adaptive
federalism. This may occur if a state’s reasons for not acting relate to
a policy innovation choice or a desire to learn from other states’
approaches. It is entirely understandable that some subnational units
of government may prefer the status quo over approaches to
regulation that have been adopted by neighboring jurisdictions or that
are emerging as a national trend. It is legitimate for a state to make
an explicit political choice to opt for the status quo, as many states
have in the context of marijuana laws or (prior to national health care
policies) in failing to adopt state-specific plans to address health care
costs. Yet, recalcitrance is sometimes a product of structural limits on
state’s making any decision at all; such structural limits can increase
the costs of coordination for other states, thwart inter-jurisdictional
competition, or preclude any consideration of spillover benefits of
state policies. At the extreme, recalcitrance can represent an overt
effort to thwart national regulatory goals, as may occur when a state
or local government inaction precludes approval of an electric power
transmission line that promotes coordination or creates interstate
benefits, or if a state persistently fails to enforce environmental or
health and safety regulations. Recalcitrance is especially likely to be
maladaptive in the context of cooperative federalism initiatives—if for
example, a state is resisting federal interference with its programs—
although as I argue, its scope is not limited to cooperative federalism
and extends to other scenarios where adaptation produces positive
externalities.
By acting independently, a state may engage in inaction with
respect to an issue related to climate change, favoring the status quo
over innovations in sustainable energy. There are good reasons states
may choose to do this, including poor renewable resource allocation
for energy production (as may occur throughout parts of Southeastern
United States) or a concern about the costs that sustainable energy
initiatives may impose on consumers. These reasons may make
recalcitrance legitimate, especially where a state has made a deliberate
choice to favor the status quo. However, in some instances states may
be recalcitrant not because of a deliberate choice, but because of
structural limits on government action that impede any deliberate
choice in the first place.
A good example of this maladaptive form of recalcitrance is state
holdouts in siting new transmission lines for electric power. In some
states, state siting statutes limit proposals for new transmission lines
to an in-state utility, foreclosing any possibility of an out-of-state
utility proposing to build a line and also foreclosing any possibility of
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a non-utility developer proposing a line.40 For example, in Arkansas
an administrative law judge recently chose a transmission line route
that would have relocated a line through Missouri; however the line’s
proponent, a utility operating in Arkansas, lacked retail customers
and operations in Missouri and thus may be ineligible to apply for
eminent domain to build the line.41 Even in states that might allow
for a broader range of transmission line developers to propose to build
lines, many state regulators are limited in considering the impact of a
line on in-state residents and are not allowed to consider the broader
benefits a new line might create for the reliability and efficiency of the
grid regionally.42 Arizona regulators, for example, took a narrow
approach to considering the benefits of a new line, refusing to approve
a transmission line that would allow for the export of low carbon
emission power to Southern California.43 Arizona regulators nixed the
proposed transmission line calling the project a “230-mile extension
cord.”44 The limited legal authority of many state siting statutes
means that in many instances regulators cannot even act on
applications to build transmission lines that would relieve congestion
on the grid and open up new markets for renewable energy sources,
especially wind power.
Similar stories may perhaps be told about state regulators failing
to implement cooperative federalism programs where they lack
enforcement authority, or about states refusing to pass implementing
legislation for initiatives related to the implementation of federal
health care laws or authorizing cooperation with federal immigration
policies. It is important, of course, to distinguish maladaptive
recalcitrance from a state making a deliberate choice to act
independently to support the status quo. What makes recalcitrance
maladaptive is the institutional features of state governments that
thwart any effort to evaluate benefits of status quo vis-à-vis the
alternatives. For example, the limited siting statutes for electric power
transmission avoid placing any political choice on a state’s regulatory
agenda at all. Recalcitrance can become maladaptive when it begins
to undermine other adaptive federalism goals, especially when it
strategically increases the costs of interstate coordination or attempts
to thwart any inter-jurisdictional competition by attempting to
40.

Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed
Milieu: Evolving Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State and
Regional Considerations, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 705, 719–21 (2010).

41.

See Jeffrey Tomich, “Very Real” Tension Between Grid Operators,
State Regulators on Display in Ark. Siting Case, Energy & Env’t
(Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059994595.

42.

Brown & Rossi, supra note 40, at 721–26.

43.

Id. at 725.

44.

Tomich, supra note 41.
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impose one state’s approach onto other states in a region. As the
example of state holdouts in transmission siting illustrates, a core
problem is that state inaction may work to benefit a few at the
expense of the many in ways that are not welfare-enhancing and that
thwart the kind of interstate coordination needed to solve some
regulatory problems. When this occurs, it should not be celebrated as
a form of adaptive federalism but should be recognized as
maladaptation.
B.

Maladaptive Backlash

Another variation of maladaptive federalism is state or local
regulatory backlash. Of course, reversing or diluting a previous policy
course may occur for good reasons, including a state’s assessment that
the costs of a previous choice do not justify the benefits. For example,
states may legitimately adopt a moratorium on activities such as
fracking or limit a state agency’s jurisdiction—completely reversing
the previous regulatory status quo—especially where there is a need
to take some time to learn about benefits, or because a decision has
been made that the benefits do not justify the costs. States may also
whittle away at programs, diluting previous regulatory priorities.
However, what makes reversal or dilution of policy choices
maladaptive is the low cost of their enactment, given limits on veto
points in adopting policies at the state and local level.45 States
legislatures may, for example, reverse adaptive federalism policies for
reasons related to symbolic political values or as an effort to thwart
regional innovation, with little or no serious assessment of
jurisdictional or regional benefits. This kind of backlash may be
common in cooperative federalism programs, where states resist
federal regulatory encroachment; backlash also presents a potential for
maladaptation in contexts where there is no federal regulation at all—
as where a state with a stand-alone regulatory program rapidly
changes course without any serious evaluation of the program.
A lead example this Article discusses is the national movement to
repeal and dilute clean energy standards, also known as renewable
portfolio requirements (RPSs). As is argued above, state initiatives
like RPS standards advance adaptive federalism goals, such as
45.

Some of these limits are a byproduct of the simple fact that subnational
units of government are smaller and more likely to be responsive to
interest groups, which also face fewer collective action obstacles at the
state or local level than they may face at the national level. See The
Federalist No. 10 (Madison). Other features, however, relate to the
state lawmaking process, which does not generally face as many
obstacles in law adoption as does the U.S. Congress. The highest profile
example of course is the adoption of direct democracy initiatives in
many states. See Caroline J. Tolbert & Daniel A. Smith, Representation
and Direct Democracy in the United States, 42 Representation 25
(2006).
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coordination. But RPS standards promote sources of energy that are
more expensive to produce than energy from fossil fuel-fired plants
and, not surprisingly, have also come under attack for imposing costs
on consumers. This has led to a backlash effort to repeal or scape
back RPS initiatives in many of the more than thirty states that have
adopted them.46
Nationally, the push to repeal state RPS’s is being driven by the
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a group that stresses
free-market views and drafts legislation supporting its positions.47 The
organization has drafted model legislation, dubbed the Electricity
Freedom Act,48 aimed at repealing state renewable energy mandates
across the country.49 The model legislation takes the position that
wind and solar power are too expensive and unreliable, and that
requiring utilities to use renewable energy threatens grid reliability
and ultimately increases the cost of doing business through rate
increases or higher taxes.50
This model legislation is influencing RPS repeal initiatives in
more than a dozen states, with over forty bills to repeal or cut-back
within the scope of RPS standards considered by state legislatures in
2013.51 For example, former Duke Energy engineer, current ALEC
member, and current North Carolina Representative Mike Hager was
the lead sponsor of the HB 298 proposal seeking repeal of the North
46.

U.S. efforts to repeal RPS standards are not unique, and echo repeal
efforts to repeal or scale back renewable energy requirements that have
occurred in Europe and elsewhere in the world. See Stephen Castle,
Europe, Facing Economic Pain, May Ease Climate Rules, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 22, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/23/
business/international/european-union-lowers-ambitions-on-renewableenergy.html?_r=0.

47.

ALEC counts among its members some of the most powerful fossil fuel
energy corporations, including ExxonMobil, Koch Industries, Duke
Energy and Peabody Energy, the country’s largest coal producer. ALEC
Corps., http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/ALEC_Corporations
(last visited March 3, 2014).

48.

See Be Alerted: ALEC Prioritizes Renewable Energy for Next Year,
Sustainable Bus. (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:27 AM), http://www.sustainable
business.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/24245.

49.

See Tiffany Germain & Matt Kasper, The Loophole That’s Letting
Conservatives Manipulate Renewable Energy Standards, Climate
Progress (Mar. 4, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/
2013/03/04/1662051/hydropower-renewable-energy-standards/.

50.

Be Alerted, supra note 48.

51.

See Maria Gallucci, Renewable Energy Standards Target of MultiPronged Attack, InsideClimate News (Mar. 19, 2013), https://
insideclimatenews.org/print/24712 (“In total, 42 separate efforts are
wending their way through legislatures and courts in more than two
dozen states. . . .”).
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Carolina RPS - a proposal based on ALEC’s model legislation.52 North
Carolina’s RPS, enacted in 2007, requires 12.5% of electricity from
investor-owned utilities to come from renewable sources by 2021.53 A
bill introduced in 2013, House Bill 298, titled the Affordable and
Reliable Energy Act,54 proposed to fully repeal North Carolina’s RPS.
The proposed bill suggested the state RPS is a “wasteful, uneconomic,
and inefficient” use of energy.55 Perhaps indicative of a strong fossilfuel industry lobbying influence, surviving text to the current RPS
law targeted by House Bill 298 includes provisions allowing utilities to
charge their ratepayers to recover compliance costs from the clean
energy requirements.56
Such RPS repeal efforts have had a high profile. They have not
generally succeeded for a variety of reasons.57 Yet they continue to be
proposed and considered.58 Even where outright repeals have not been
passed into law by state legislature several states have used the
opportunity to reassess and, in some instances, substantially dilute
existing RPS standards. There are several other examples of potential
backlash regarding RPS standards, including: expansion of the
definition of renewable sources to reduce RPS quotas, to include
hydro or other conventional sources, to introduce multiplier effects for
favored sources, or repeal of state biofuel standards.59
52.

See Connor Gibson, Duke Energy & Koch Brothers Aim to Kill Clean
Energy in North Carolina, Greenpeace Blogs, http://green
peaceblogs.org/2013/03/14/alec-bill-to-kill-nc-clean-energy-law-surfaceskoch-fronts-and-duke-energy-behind-the-curtains/.

53.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133.8 (2007).

54.

H.B. 298, Sess. 2013 (N.C. 2013).

55.

Id.

56.

See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133.8(h)(4) (2007).

57.

See generally Brad Plumer, State Renewable-Energy Laws Turn Out to
be Incredibly Hard to Repeal, Wash. Post: Wonkblog (Aug. 8, 2013,
3:52 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/
08/08/state-renewable-energy-laws-turn-out-to-be-really-hard-to-repeal/
(discussing the difficulty of repealing state renewable energy laws and
reasons for such difficulty).

58.

See, e.g., Jeffrey Tomich, In Kansas, Renewable Energy Standard Again
Under Attack, Midwest Energy News (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.
midwestenergynews.com/2014/01/24/in-kansas-renewable-energystandard-again-under-attack/.

59.

See Katherine Heriot Hoffer & Jeff Lyng, The Real RPS Story Is Not
Rollback, Advanced Energy Perspectives (Jul. 11, 2013, 5:41 PM),
http://blog.aee.net/aee/bid/316387/the-real-rps-story-is-not-rollback
(describing the most common policy initiative adopted by state
legislatures regarding RPS standards in 2013 as “expansion in the
definitions of eligible resources” including the additions of hydroelectric
power in the RPS standards in Connecticut and Montana).
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Like recalcitrance, backlash should not be automatically
celebrated as a form of adaptive federalism, especially when it
undermines innovation at the state level or efforts by states to
coordinate renewable and sustainable energy initiatives. The concern
is that some backlash initiatives are motivated by efforts to increase
the costs of interstate coordination or thwart others’ innovations and
pose significant negative externalities on those outside of the state
that is reversing its previous initiatives. At the core, concerns with
backlash are difficult to identify and probably would require some
assessment of what is motivating a state’s lawmaking efforts, but that
does not mean that indifference towards state efforts is required
by federalism.

III. Addressing Maladaptation
The coordination challenges presented by adaptive federalism
arise because state-led initiatives can create both positive and
negative externalities. Positive externalities may arise where one state
takes the lead but other states hold out from addressing a problem
because they can benefit from the leading state’s regulatory program.
There is nothing wrong with positive externalities per se, but their
existence may undermine the incentives for some states to take
initiative in the first instance. Negative externalities arise when one
state’s initiatives impose costs outside of that particular jurisdiction
that undermine other states’ initiatives. For example, negative
externalities may result from state-led cap and trade initiatives, due
to carbon leakage.60 Similarly, as Lincoln Davies has highlighted, state
RPS programs can impose monitoring costs on other states, as the
need to evaluate out-of-state renewable energy production becomes
important to a workable renewable energy credit trading program.61
To the extent that maladaptation presents a problem for climate
change and sustainability initiatives, a challenge for regulators is how
to minimize maladaptation without a) decreasing the space for
independent state regulatory initiatives, or b) launching into a futile
exercise in attempting to determine the intent or purposes of state
regulators. The best tools for facilitating adaptive federalism would
leave sufficient space for independent state decisions to flourish and
innovate in ways that enhance social welfare, without requiring
federal agencies or courts to assess the intent or purpose of
subnational regulators on a case-by-case basis. The analysis presented
in this Article favors entrenchment tools that are attentive to the
enactment costs of maladaptation, rather than outright preemption.
60.

See Wiener, supra note 19, at 1966–73 (discussing state level actions and
carbon leakage).

61.

See Davies, supra note 3, at 1378–79.
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This kind of approach leaves states the opportunity to evolve
independently, as adaptive federalism envisions, while also allowing
the federal government a role in setting an agenda and in steering
policy objectives. Climate change and sustainability initiatives provide
a particularly fertile opportunity for the federal government to play
this role.
A.

Conventional Federal Tools for Discouraging Maladaptation

The two most common tools used by the federal government to
address the coordination issues presented by adaptive federalism
solutions are the substantive preemption of state law and the
provision of monetary incentives. In the end, however, the type of
preemption in most environmental statutes does not solve the need to
address coordination problems among state regulatory standards,
implementation and enforcement approaches. Cooperative federalism
programs, such as many environmental statutes that rely on backup
penalties imposed by the federal government, do not necessarily solve
interstate coordination problems presented by adaptive federalism
initiatives. Indeed, in contexts where such programs do not exist—
such as in the standards for development of renewable energy—state
regulators are largely left to their own devices in developing,
implementing and enforcing regulatory standards, such as
RPS programs.
Expansive federal preemption, such as field preemption of a
regulatory area or express preemption of a state’s regulatory
initiatives, would avoid the need for state regulation of an activity
altogether. Where the federal government completely “preempts” a
certain regulatory area, it leaves states little ability to decide
regulatory programs on their own, and thus may reject adaptive
federalism solutions to regulatory problems. In the environmental and
energy law contexts, such preemption is rare, and is usually
accomplished through express rather than field preemption.62

62.

While rare, such preemption is not extinct. Section 209(d) of the Clean
Air Act prohibits states from adopting “any standard relating to the
control of emissions from new motor vehicle[s].” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)
(2006). There are exceptions to this rule. See Carlson, supra note 4, at
1109 (discussing California’s request for waiver of the CAA’s one-sizefits-all standard for motor vehicles); see also Jonathan H. Adler,
Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and Virtues of Climate Federalism, 17
Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 443, 462–64 (2008) (arguing in favor
of a general waiver provision for environmental law, similar to
California’s fuel waiver provision in the CAA). Other preemption
provisions can be found in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2012), and the Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2617 (2012).
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In contrast to this kind of preemption, many federal
environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act63 and Clean Water
Act,64 establish “floor” regulatory standards.65 Such standards allow
states significant flexibility in enforcing federal standards and
pursuing their own emissions standards over and above the federal
minimum.66 Elsewhere, a co-author and I have argued that this kind
of “floor” preemption should serve as a model for energy as well as
environmental law.67 While floor preemption may leave states
considerable leeway to pursue their own regulatory priorities, floor
preemption does not necessarily solve the coordination challenges
presented by adaptive federalism. Indeed, to the extent it leave states
space to decide what standards and implementation programs to
allow, it may even encourage the kinds of independent state decisions
that prevent maladaptive coordination problems.
Independent of preemption, there may be opportunities for the
federal government to solve coordination problems through the
provision of regulatory carrots (typically monetary benefits) or the
imposition sticks (penalties). Although the availability of carrots may
depend on national resources, there may be opportunities for federal
regulators to offer states incentives to coordinate and share
information in developing and enforcing regulatory standards. Some
cooperative federalism programs draw on such “carrots,” especially
where the federal government offers fiscal incentives for states to
cooperate. As Brian Galle has observed, the political process has a
tendency to overproduce carrots.68 Still, the availability of “carrots”
depends on the federal budget, and the distribution of dollars can
raise significant conditional funding and commerce clause problems
(e.g., health care). Even if funding for coordinated solutions were
63.

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2006).

64.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).

65.

See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 14, at 1565–66.

66.

For a skeptical argument regarding the ability of floor preemption to
improve emissions standards, see generally Adler, supra note 9.

67.

See Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy
Floors, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1283 (2013).

68.

Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the
Choice of Price Instruments, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 797, 797 (2012). Galle
identifies a range of reasons for the overproduction of carrots by
government, id. at 844, including the congressional budget process, but
he also observes that the overproduction of carrots at the subnational
level may be especially likely due to inter-jurisdictional competition
among states. Id. at 841–42. Some programs that are embraced as forms
of adaptive federalism operate as carrots, and if these are overproduced
it may be important to retain space for reconsideration or repeal of such
programs—an approach that is consistent with the enactment cost
approach made in this section.
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available, at a minimum, there are structural limits on what the
federal government can do in making carrots contingent on states
adopting particular policy approaches.69
Stick approaches, such as penalties for noncompliance with a prearticulated standard, have worked well in the context of
environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act.70 However, these
also depend on Congress giving federal agencies direct or backup
enforcement authority—and in many areas of energy and
environmental regulation there is no such federal enforcement
mechanism. Absent enforcement sticks, which exist in some
cooperative federalism programs, it is not clear how well adaptive
federalism works—and it seems to be precisely these kinds of contexts
where maladaptation can present problems for coordinated interstate
solutions to regulatory programs.
B.

State-Led Efforts to Discourage Maladaptation

State-led efforts can address coordination problems, even absent
any kind of preemption or monetary incentives on the part of the
federal government. A good example of a bottom-up regional effort to
try to address coordination problems in the context of climate change
is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeastern
U.S.—“a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions
from the power sector.”71 RGGI has not only led to a market-based
trading initiative, but has facilitated greater coordination of RPS
standards and other sustainability initiatives among its member
states, helping to entrench and strengthen state-led initiatives.72
RGGI is a voluntary initiative negotiated by the governors of its
member states; although its members have agreed to treat emissions
reductions as binding, it has no sovereign authority, and all authority
is vested entirely within its member states.73 Similarly voluntary

69.

See, e.g., Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law After
Sebelius, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1003 (2014).

70.

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2006).

71.

See Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/.

72.

For a discussion of how RGGI policies interact with state RPS
standards, see Robert C. Grace, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
Moves Forward—What Does It Mean for Wind Power, New England
Wind F., http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/newengland/policy_
rggi.asp.

73.

See Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI, Inc., Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/rggi.
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initiatives to address climate issues have developed among western
and midwestern states.74
States might also potentially draw on more formal arrangements
to coordinate and address spillover problems with sustainability
initiatives. Interstate agreements could allow states to create binding
and enforceable agreements, but under the Constitution these require
the consent of the U.S. Congress.75 In 2005 Congress amended the
Federal Power Act to authorize three or more contiguous states to
enter into an interstate compact that establishes regional siting
agencies for electric power transmission and prohibited FERC from
using its preemptive backstop authority over state siting operating
under such compacts.76 As Robin Craig has argued, interstate
compacts present an opportunity to solve many of the interstate
coordination problems associated with the expansion of electric power
transmission facilities; although FERC itself may not be able to
preempt state siting procedures, compacts themselves may prove
helpful in using preemption in overcoming state holdout problems.77
However, such compacts have been slow to form; despite widespread
use of interstate compacts in addressing regional issues such as water
and port management, no interstate compacts have been formed to
address electric power transmission issues—though states are
beginning to consider the possibility.78
Short of state-led initiatives of formal compacts, voluntary
industry arrangements may also help to solve some of the
coordination challenges presented by adaptive federalism programs.
Voluntary initiatives have no doubt played a significant, albeit
underappreciated, role in environmental regulation, alongside federal
and state-led initiatives.79 In the context of energy and sustainability
initiatives, private initiatives have also been significant mechanisms

74.

See DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency,
supra note 19 (summarizing multi-state climate initiatives).

75.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.

76.

Energy Policy Act of 2005, § 1221(i), Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594
(codified as 16 U.S.C. § 824(p)(i) (2012)).

77.

Robin K. Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and
Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects,
81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 771, 824–28 (2010).

78.

See Jim Malewitz, States Weigh Compact to Bolster Energy Grid,
STATELINE (July 26, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/
stateline/headlines/states-weigh-compact-to-bolster-energy-grid85899493041.

79.

See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental
Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 129 (2013) (discussing the value
of “private activities as a discrete new model of environmental
governance”).
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for solving interstate coordination problems. Some of these initiatives
have included industry-wide certification of technical standards for
smart grid and transmission operation80 as well as private initiatives
certifying renewable energy credits for RPS programs.81 In addition,
although voluntary arrangements such as power pools have played a
major role in managing interstate power markets for decades,82
beginning in the 1990’s interstate regional transmission operators
(RTOs) began to form as voluntary organizations comprised of
utilities owning transmission lines.83 RTOs, which operate subject to
the regulatory approval of FERC, have filled an important regulatory
gap by helping private firms to mediate the coordination challenges
presented by independent state regulatory initiatives—in ways that
neither state nor federal authorities have been able to mediate on
their own.
C.

Diffusing Maladaptation by Addressing Enactment Costs

Adaptive federalism approaches may thrive in contexts where
federal regulators have sticks at their disposal to steer states towards
a certain regulatory vision. A good example is how federal
environmental regulators can recognize certain state energy efficiency
initiatives in implementing its new carbon emissions regulation under
section 111(d) of the Clean Act Act, or how a state may opt out of
these flexible approaches in favor of imposition of stricter emissions
requirements by the EPA (which ultimately may serve as a form of
penalty for states not adopting energy efficiency or RPS standards).84
However, even where federal regulators lack any authority to impose
standards directly onto the states, federal regulators may still have
80.

For an excellent discussion of these industry-led efforts, see Eisen, supra
note 5, at 29–31.

81.

See Green-e, Renewable Energy Certificates 101, Green-e,
http://www.green-e.org/learn_recs_101.shtml (providing background
information about one such program, called Renewable Energy
Certifications (RECs)).

82.

Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Markets for Power:
An Analysis of Electric Utility Deregulation 4–8 (1983)
(describing the role that private pooling arrangements played in
promoting reliability standards in the electric power industry during the
1960’s and 1970’s).

83.

See Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System
Operators (ISO), Federal Energy Regulation Commission,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last visited
Feb. 28, 2014) (describing the formation of RTOs and ISOs).

84.

See Nathan Richardson, Playing Without Aces: Offsets and the Limits
of Flexibility Under Clean Air Act Climate Policy, 42 ENVTL. L. 735,
774 (2012) (discussing the options states have for flexible environmental
policy).
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tools at their disposal to discourage maladaptation—specifically by
paying attention to the enactment costs associated with the state
lawmaking process that produces adaptive federalism initiatives.
Energy law provides an example of how federal regulators can do this.
Federal or regional regulation can discourage the kinds of
maladaption that are most likely to be welfare-reducing or present
accountability problems by being attentive to the enactment costs
associated with the lawmaking process that produces subnational
maladaptation. This can be done through applying implied
preemption doctrine to reduce the costs of adopting adaptive
programs and increasing the costs of maladaptation without the
federal government making a policy choice on behalf of a state.
Recalcitrance can be addressed by lowering the enacting costs of
subnational adaptation—as with federal statutes to authorize
governors or state agencies to act, even where state legislatures have
not authorized them to do so or have explicitly limited their
authority. Backlash can be addressed by increasing the costs of state
repealing regulatory approaches that create positive externalities; this
can be done if federal regulators endorse state policies that produce
national or regional benefits without explicitly adopting them as a
one-size-fits-all solution.
Federal agencies may also possess tools to decrease the costs of
states taking adaptive approaches to problems related to climate
change in the first place. One of the barriers to states approving
transmission lines is the perception that state executive officers often
do not possess the power to approve transmission lines for the
interstate power market absent state legislative authorization—a
policy that gives the status quo of no legislative authorization a
virtual veto point over any approval of new transmission lines.85 In
the federal spending context, Roderick Hills has argued in favor of
“dissecting the state” by using federal preemption to authorize
municipal governments and counties to accept federal dollars even
absent state legislative authorization.86 Similarly, the use of implied
preemption based on the Federal Power Act, which authorizes FERC
to set just and reasonable rates87 and to promote reliability in
85.

See Jim Rossi, Transmission Siting in Deregulated Wholesale Power
Markets: Re-Imagining the Role of Courts in Resolving Federal-State
Siting Impasses, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 315, 332–38 (2005)
(offering a proposal to deal with “recalcitrant state legislatures”).

86.

Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to
Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1999).

87.

FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce,” and over the “sale of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce,” and over “all facilities for such
transmission or sale of electric energy.” Federal Power Act § 201, 16
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interstate power markets,88 could be used as a mechanism to preempt
state separation of powers limitations on executive, municipal
government or county approval over transmission lines.89 Such an
approach might consider non-legislative actors as presumptively
authorized to consider applications by non-utilities or utilities from
outside of that particular jurisdiction, or require them to take into
account broader national concerns in refusing or denying siting
applications.90 Such preemption could be constructed or a state
legislature could explicitly pass a law to the contrary, overriding any
federal authorization for a state regulator to act, but this would occur
through a deliberate choice, not by merely adhering to the status quo.
By preempting state separation of powers limitations on the ability of
state regulators to consider siting applications or to take into account
broader benefits, federal regulators could reduce the enactment costs
associated with states implementing adaptive federalism solutions,
enabling a lawmaking process at the state level that would promote
greater interstate coordination. This kind of approach to reducing the
costs of adaptive federalism approaches to energy and environmental
issues can also be used to empower governors, mayors and other
executive officials to take into account climate change and
sustainability goals in their policy initiatives.91
In the context of adaptive federalism programs that have been
adopted by individual states but are challenged by backlash at the
state level, such as with repeal of RPS standards,92 federal regulators
also have opportunities to address enactment costs and discourage
maladaptive approaches by states. Where state regulators have
adopted adaptive federalism measures that produce national or
regional benefits but attempt to dilute or repeal them, federal
regulators can discourage maladaptive approaches through regulatory
measures that are attentive to the enactment costs associated with
regulatory change at the state level. Federal regulators can do so by
U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012). For the sections providing for FERC’s rate
authority, see Federal Power Act §§ 205–06, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d–824e
(2012).
88.

Section 215 gives FERC authority to promote grid reliability. Federal
Power Act § 215, 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2012).

89.

See supra note 85 and accompanying text.

90.

Congress authorized FERC having backstop preemptive authority over
state siting approval of transmission lines in limited geographic areas in
2005, but courts have scaled back on FERC’s authority and the agency
has never exercised it. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 39, at 1858
(discussing the history of “federal backstop siting authority”).

91.

See supra note 85 and accompanying text.

92.

See supra notes 44–58 and accompanying text (discussing RPS repeal
initiatives).
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endorsing state or regional policy goals or build these into national or
regional regulatory priorities, thereby increasing the enactment costs
of state backlash.
An example of this in the energy context is FERC’s landmark
Order No. 1000, adopted in 2011.93 Order No. 1000 amends the
transmission planning and cost allocation requirements that FERC
previously established in Order No. 89094 to require coordinated
regional transmission planning, including the consideration of state
public policy requirements in the planning process.95 In addition,
Order No. 1000 addresses how the costs of new transmission projects
are paid for by requiring each regional or interregional plan to include
a method for allocating costs of producing the proposed new
transmission facility that comports with some basic principles.96
Regional transmission planning is intended to resolve a region’s
transmission needs “more efficiently or cost-effectively than solutions”
planned by each individual public utility transmission provider—as
has historically occurred.97 Order No. 1000 requires the local and
regional transmission planning process to account for transmission
needs driven by what FERC calls “Public Policy Requirements”98—
defined to include state enacted statutes and regulations for the
electric power industry.99 Renewable portfolio standards are an
important example of the types of state laws that would affect
transmission needs, and must be considered when creating the
regional plan.100
93.

Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning
and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000), 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842
(Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). In a consolidated
challenge to Order No. 1000 by several state regulators and utility
industry stakeholders, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
upheld FERC’s rules. See S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, __ F.3d __
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (12-1232).

94.

Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission
Service (Order No. 890), 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266 (Mar. 15, 2007) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 37) (requiring each public utility
transmission provider to have a coordinated, open, and transparent
regional transmission planning process).

95.

See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000-A), 77 Fed.
Reg. 32,184, 32,189 (May 31, 2012) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
(discussing the scope of Order No. 1000).

96.

See id. at 32,184 (affirming Order No. 1000’s requirements).

97.

Id. at 32,202.

98.

Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning
and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000), 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,871.

99.

Id. at 49,845.

100. See id. at 49,919.
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One federalism objection101 some in the industry raise with Order
No. 1000 is based on the principle that the federal government cannot
commandeer state legislatures and executives to pursue federal
interests.102 More specifically, industry commentators in the
rulemaking process have claimed that FERC cannot require public
utility transmission providers to consider the impacts of public
policies under federal and state laws and regulations. Boiled down, the
concern is that consideration of regional planning based on public
policy requirements can produce a result where one state’s public
policy agenda dominates the others. If one state’s policy dominates
the outcome of the regional transmission planning process, the policies
of that state in effect could be forced onto customers in other states
within that region, regardless of whether they have voted against such
a policy in their home state.103 This disconnect between who
establishes public policy and who is affected by it, critics maintain,
creates a potential accountability problem. Regional planning could
allow one state to impose costs on consumers in another state
“without sufficient democratic or procedural checks and balances.”104
Of course, RTOs are tasked with reconciling and prioritizing
competing state policies, yet they are insulated from the political
process. Citizens who disagree with the regional plan, or the Public
Policy Requirements that affect the plan’s creation, may not be able
to vote to change the plan if the officials shaping the plan are in
another state or are not in an elected position. In the worst scenario,
the Order might permit one state’s public policy agenda to adversely
affect electricity prices in another state that does not share that

101. FERC Order Nos. 1000, 1000-A, and 1000-B collectively only mention
“federalism” in Order No. 1000-A’s part III.A.1.e. See Transmission
Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities (Order No. 1000-A), 77 Fed. Ref. at 32,216 (“Several
petitioners express concerns . . . that the requirements raise federalism
issues.”). Over and over again in its order FERC claims that nothing in
the order preempts state authority, but to the extent FERC’s order
envisions the agency approving cost allocation mechanisms, this may
preempt state retail rate decisions. See id. at 32,219 (“We disagree . . .
that Order No. 1000’s requirements regarding Public Policy
Requirements raise significant federalism issues.”).
102. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177–78 (1992)
(holding that state sovereignty constrains federal mandates); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997) (confirming this anticommandeering principle).
103. See Request for Clarification and Rehearing at 10, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051
(2011) (No. RM10-23-000) (arguing that regional regulation raises
federalism concerns).
104. Id.
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agenda.105 In effect, this means the Order permits the federal
government to require state taxpayers to subsidize the policy goals of
other states that are in no way politically accountable to the
burdened state.
Ultimately, however, Order 1000 changes the planning process,
and does not mandate any specific outcome. FERC adopted these
planning requirements to help ensure that transmission service is
offered at just and reasonable rates, and not to infringe on state
jurisdiction.106 On rehearing, FERC clarified that the Order only
requires consideration of the Public Policy Requirements; it does not,
however, mandate that these requirements be fulfilled, whether they
are RPS policies or other energy efficiency or climate change
measures.107 Moreover, it characterizes the Public Policy Requirements
as “facts” that can affect the need for transmission services, and that
merely need to be considered.108 Of course, in implementation, FERC
may frown upon proposed plans that fail to adopt such state
requirements, but it has not yet done so.
In the end, this landmark set of regulations provides a mechanism
for multi-state transmission operators (RTOs), and FERC, to endorse
state public policy goals such as RPS standards in transmission
planning and cost allocation. Once an RTO has considered these as a
part of its planning process, to the extent it incorporates them into
future transmission projects and their cost allocation, this can help to
entrench existing state public policy requirements within a particular
region. At this point, any state legislature that wished to endorse a
policy at odds with these priorities, or repeal them, would face higher
enactment costs (making repeal of RPS standards less likely); for
example, RPS repeal efforts would face resistance from utilities in the
state that are members of an RTO that has taken these into account
(helping utilities to recover the costs of compliance and new
transmission infrastructure in their rates), and if these are repealed,
the RTO will now face the potential for overcapacity in transmission
infrastructure—a cost that would be borne at least in part by
consumers in that state. Of course, increasing the costs of repeal may

105. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000-A), 77 Fed. Ref.
at 32,216 (noting concerns that regional policies could impact some
states adversely).
106. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning
and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000), 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842,
49,860 (Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
107. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning
and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000-A), 77 Fed. Ref. at
32,217.
108. Id.
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also increase the costs of adopting a policy in the first place, if state
political actors expect that their policies are more difficult to reverse;
this might make adaptation more difficult in some circumstances, but
also can produce accountability benefits by ensuring that state
political actors have weighed the implications of their policy choices.
In this sense, by increasing the enactment costs of maladaptation,
Order No. 1000 may not present the kind of accountability deficiency
some of its critiques allege. Instead, it can be understood as an effort
to improve accountability of state policy choices to ensure that
adaptive federalism measures are more sensitive to the coordination
benefits that they can produce.

Conclusion
In sum, federalism provides space for state politics to encourage
adaptation, but not all independent state regulation should be
celebrated as a form of “adaptive federalism.” State climate change
initiatives provide a fertile example of how adaptation can be effective
in addressing social problems, particularly where the federal
government has not adopted comprehensive legislation. However,
state politics can also sometimes lead to inaction or backlash—forms
of maladaptation that can undermine adaptive federalism, particularly
its coordination benefits. This Article does not suggest that this is
constitutionally inappropriate, or that it should be limited. However,
what has been described as maladaptation can represent a type of
inaction or backlash that, at its core, is not consistent with federalism
in certain regulatory contexts. This kind of maladaptation presents a
challenge for regulatory policies designed to promote innovation,
interjurisdictional competition, or coordinated regional approaches.
Yet most discussions of federalism are generally indifferent to the
substance of state policy choices and assume any exercise of state
sovereignty advances federalism values, regardless of the nature of the
state policy. Maladaptation illustrates how this view is impoverished.
In some instances, exercises of state power simply cannot be
characterized as promoting the values of regulatory competition,
improved interstate coordination, or regulatory experimentation—a
state political choice can be welfare-reducing (as where the benefits
are concentrated and the costs dispersed, especially to those outside of
a jurisdiction), or may not be made in a way that is politically
accountable (as where positive externalities are ignored). FERC Order
No. 1000 is an illustration of how federal regulators have tools at their
disposal that do not preempt the ability of states to make adaptive
policy choices while also increasing the enactment costs of states
acting to thwart or undermine the benefits of coordination.
Ultimately, federalism theories must account for maladaptive
exercises of state power, and assess how best to respond. This Article
has argued in favor of federal initiatives that leave states the
flexibility in policy choices but that are attentive to the enactment
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costs of states adaptation measures, especially in contexts where
coordination among states is desirable and direct federal enforcement
is lacking. I have made an effort to furnish such an account of
adaptive federalism for one narrow corner of federalism, using energy
and the environment as an example. To the extent that adaptive
federalism’s values extend to other areas where subnational
governance is desirable, the lessons about addressing maladaptation
may prove useful to understanding the entrenchment of state policies
in federalism discussions more generally.
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